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Abstract 
This paper aims to inform policy looking to step up investment in the electricity sector of 
developing countries and align it to other development goals such as universal access to 
energy or sustainability. Three questions guide the analysis: (1) How and why has private 
and donor finance for electrification changed across time? (2) What are the different 
motivations of private investors and donors as regards who and what gets financed? (3) Are 
sustainability and equitable access priorities for private and donor investment? These 
questions are addressed by describing finance flows during the period 1990–2010 and 
performing an econometric analysis to explain inter-country allocation. 
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1 Introduction 
Providing access to electricity to the 1.3 billion people who currently live without it, and 
improving the quality and quantity of supply for those already connected in developing 
countries, will require a significant increase in finance for the electricity sector (Bazilian et al. 
2010; IEA 2011; World Bank 2006; Pachauri et al. 2013). Broadly speaking, three sources 
can contribute to satisfy the ‘voracious appetite for finance’ of the electricity industry 
(Hausman, Neufeld and Schreiber 2014): official development assistance (ODA) from 
multilateral and bilateral donors; national governments (or state-owned utilities); and the 
private sector. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that reaching universal 
access by 2030 would require a fivefold increase in the amount of finance jointly provided by 
these three sources (IEA 2011). International sources of finance, including ODA and foreign 
direct investment (FDI), will play an increasing role in developing countries with low 
electrification rates (mainly in sub-Saharan Africa), where domestic sources are simply 
insufficient for the investment required (Bazilian et al. 2011; IEA 2011). 
Policymakers looking to step up investment in the electricity sector of developing countries 
and align it with other development goals such as universal access to energy or sustainability 
would benefit from an improved understanding of how these financial flows have performed 
in the past. This report shows trends of two sources, ODA and private investment, during the 
period 1990–2010, and performs an econometric analysis to explain the observed allocation 
of funds across developing countries. Three main questions guide our analysis: 
1. How and why has the contribution to the electricity sector of private investors and 
donors changed across time? 
2. What are the different motivations of private investors and donors as regards who 
gets finance and what is financed (hardware or software elements of the electricity 
system, renewable or non-renewable generation)? 
3. Is the provision of access to electricity a priority for private and donor investment? 
Data paucity has prevented the analysis of public domestic sources, even though these play 
a crucial role in electrification. For example, around 60 per cent of the conventional capacity 
in China and almost two-thirds in India are controlled by the state through direct control or a 
majority ownership stake (IEA 2014). 
Previous research looking at these questions suggests that there have been major changes 
in the way in which electrification has been financed in recent decades. Hausman et al. 
(2014) follow trends in ODA for electrification between 1970 and 2001, noting a shift from 
almost entirely domestic electric utilities in the post-Second World War era to a worldwide 
movement of privatisation, liberalisation and restructuring of the sector beginning in the 
1980s and accelerating in the 1990s as part of the neoliberal ‘Washington Consensus’. By 
the 1990s, electrification aid had shifted towards countries that were relatively poorer (but not 
those in Africa), and also towards those with more attractive governance structures. In 
addition, Hausman et al. find that aid has increasingly flowed towards countries with high 
initial investment as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) and which have restructured 
their power sectors. Gualberti et al. (2012: 20) find that although development finance for 
electrification has risen significantly in the past decade, this funding has not been channelled 
towards the countries with the lowest energy access rates, leading them to conclude that 
energy access ‘is not a priority’ for donor countries. Literature on the role of private 
investment is limited. While there is extensive literature on the determinants of international 
private investment to developing countries (e.g. Albuquerque 2003; Asiedu 2002; Kim 2000; 
Kinda 2010; Noorbakhsh, Paloni and Youssef 2001), only a small number of studies 
specifically examine the electricity sector (e.g. Bazilian et al. 2011; IEA 2014). 
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As regards the different roles of public and private finance, existing studies show that the 
private sector tends to focus on high energy expenditure households and commercial 
consumers, mainly investing in large-scale on-grid generation. Public sector investment is 
required initially for market creation, research and development, planning, policies and 
regulations, and for the provision of network services through transmission and distribution 
infrastructure. Off-grid electrification has also often been financed, at least initially, through 
government programmes and ODA (Glemarec 2012). 
This paper contributes to previous research on the topic by validating with data what is often 
presented as anecdotes and impressions, and drawing from a larger data set to provide a 
much wider picture of finance for electrification as regards: who the main providers and 
recipients are; how they have evolved through time; what is financed; whether sustainability 
(green electricity) and equity in access rank high in funders’ agendas; and what makes some 
countries more likely than others to get different sources of finance for electrification. 
The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 provides information 
on key trends in ODA and private investment in electrification between 1990 and 2010. 
Section 4 specifies an econometric model to explain aggregate electrification aid and private 
investment using economic, energy resources, governance, geographic and poverty-related 
covariates. Section 5 discusses the results, and Section 6 presents the conclusions. 
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2 Data 
Our analysis is based on ODA data and private participation in infrastructure data, as 
provided by AidData1 and the Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) database of the 
World Bank.2 We included data only between 1990 and 2010, taking into account the 
availability of disaggregated data from both databases as well as data on independent 
variables for our econometric model. 
AidData includes information from 1947 until 2013, although approximately 99 per cent of the 
data is from 1973 onwards (Tierney et al. 2011). It expands on previous efforts to bring all aid 
data together (e.g. the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s 
Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database) in the following ways: a) it has made efforts to 
include contributions that may not have been reported every year; b) it includes the 
contributions by multilateral development banks, which had not been included previously;    
c) it includes bilateral donors whose contributions had not been included like Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait; and d) it expands the number of sector codes to allow for a more precise 
disaggregation of different types of project (ibid.). 
In total, it tracks flows from 42 bilateral and 44 multilateral donors and as of early 2013 it had 
data for 1,000,864 projects. By including projects that have received loans from development 
banks, including ones provided at market prices, it expands the definition of aid beyond 
simply ODA, leaving it with a larger overall estimate of the amount of ‘aid’ that has been 
transferred to developing countries since the 1940s. 
The data are effectively disaggregated in terms of the source of funding (multilateral, 
bilateral, private or foundation), the type of funding (ODA grants, ODA loans, equity 
investment, other official flows, loans, export credit), the recipient country and the sector. It 
also disaggregates for the technology type indicating for electricity projects if the project has 
been to support electrical transmission and distribution, power generation with several 
renewable or non-renewable sources, combination of activities, energy policy and 
administrative management, energy research, or education and training. In addition, the data 
on the amount of finance are quite precise, differentiating between the commitment, 
disbursement, and overall project costs, where figures are presented in 2009 US$. In 
practice, however, information on the type of energy project is not filled in many cases, which 
required the search in the project title column of keywords ‘electri*’ and ‘power’ and the 
removal of irrelevant projects (those dealing with ‘empowerment’, for example). All projects 
were subsequently classified in three categories: ‘generation’, ‘transmission and distribution’ 
and ‘policy, education and research’. Generation projects were further classified according to 
the energy source. The database was audited to confirm the relevance of the projects 
included. A total of 13,242 aid projects were identified between 1990 and 2010, a 
significantly higher figure than that of Hausman et al. (2014), which included 3,745 projects 
between 1970 and 2001. 
Data on private sector investments was obtained from the PPI database, which is maintained 
by the World Bank (World Bank 2014) and contains data on private sector investments in 
infrastructure projects in developing countries. It covers the period between 1984 and 2012, 
and has data on more than 5,000 infrastructure projects in the developing world, including 
energy projects. Projects are included when private participation constitutes at least 25 per 
cent of the overall funding for the project, where a private company bears some of the risk 
and when the project has arrived at a certain level of financial closure, or has 25 per cent of 
construction completed. Moreover, electricity projects must have a capacity of at least           
1 megawatt (MW) of electricity or be worth at least US$1m to be included. Data are 
                                               
1 http://AidData.org/ 
2 http://ppi.worldbank.org/ 
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disaggregated according to whether the project provides generation, transmission, 
distribution or a combination of these. Generation projects are also classified as renewable 
or non-renewable and additional information is provided on the type of energy source. The 
PPI database provides information on the capacity of each generation project and on the 
number of electricity connections provided by ‘distribution’ projects. Other interesting project 
data include the type of private investment (greenfield projects, divestitures or concessions), 
the type of multilateral support received and the revenue source. 
Investments recorded by the database are those made or to be made by the project 
company under the PPI contract. When project companies are owned by both private and 
public parties, the database does not record private investment alone. Investments are 
recorded in US$m in either the year of financial closure or the year of investment but we 
show them in 2009 US$ for consistency with AidData (AidData 2.1 2014). A total of 3,052 
electricity projects were identified between 1990 and 2010. 
In practice, it is likely that there is some duplication between the PPI and AidData because 
the PPI database includes projects that have received multilateral support. We attempted to 
match both databases, but we could not identify any duplications because projects are given 
different names and different investment amounts are recorded in each database. 
To complete our analysis we conducted interviews with experts so as to check reliability of 
sources and interpret the data. We carried out five interviews during November and 
December 2014 with: Andrew Barnett, from the Policy Practice; Stephen Spratt, from IDS; 
Dana Rysankova, from the World Bank; Roberto Schaeffer, from the Universidade Federal 
do Rio de Janeiro; and Hari Natarajan, from Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH. 
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3 Trends in ODA and private investment 
flows for electrification 
3.1 How much? 
Figure 3.1 reveals the evolution of ODA and private investment for electrification between 
1990 and 2010 (with two additional years of data in the case of private investment). ODA for 
electrification was reduced in the 1990s in response to policy changes. In particular, the 
World Bank shifted away from the idea of providing finance for public utilities, and towards 
the encouragement of privatisation reforms to facilitate private sector investment (Gualberti 
et al. 2012). As neatly explained in a paper about political considerations relevant to energy 
and economic growth (Barnett 2014), the move towards the attraction of private capital was 
initially a tactical one, driven by the realisation that ODA was not sufficient for an effective 
electrification programme in most developing countries. However, it also became an 
ideological necessity in the era of the Washington Consensus. Moreover, even though there 
are very clear associations between energy use and economic growth and development, 
evidence for the impacts of support for electrification per se on these goals was increasingly 
disputed within the World Bank (IEG 1994; World Bank 1995), leading donors to the 
conclusion that support for rural electrification, for example, was ‘a bottomless pit of expense, 
which frequently added to the insolvency of state run utilities’ (Lucas et al. 2003: 10). In 
conjunction with growing civil society opposition to the World Bank’s role in supporting large-
scale energy projects, there seemed little reason for the World Bank to continue supporting 
this area (ibid.). 
The World Bank’s shift away from support for electricity in developing countries had a 
demonstration effect on other bilateral donors as well, which reduced their support for 
electricity (ibid.). 
Figure 3.1 ODA and private finance for electrification (US$m), 1990–2010 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from AidData 2.1 (2014) and World Bank (2014). All figures are in millions and in constant 
2009 US$. 
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As a consequence of all of these factors, support for electrification as a share of overall 
development assistance also fell considerably from the levels of the 1980s until 2003, as can 
be seen from Figure 3.2. It is worth noting that much of this decline occurred within a broader 
context of falling international aid. Between 1991 and 1997, all major donors reduced their 
aid relative to their gross national product (GNP) as a response to the ending of the political 
pressure to provide aid which had been generated by the Cold War (Lucas et al. 2003). 
Figure 3.2 Electrification finance as percentage of total development 
finance, 1990–2010 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from AidData 2.1 (2014) 
Finance for electrification has since risen in its share of ODA from 2003 onwards due to a 
revived emphasis on the importance of energy for development (Gualberti et al. 2012). This 
emphasis was partly in response to a reassessment of the assumption that the private sector 
could be relied upon to make the required investments in electricity after its own contribution 
fell markedly following the Asian financial crisis (Hausman et al. 2014). The 2006 World Bank 
publication Infrastructure at the Crossroads noted the decline in private sector investment 
and also, as a result, a growth in demand for World Bank support from developing country 
governments, as well as a broader reappraisal of the importance of infrastructure in 
development (World Bank 2006). Moreover, in a subsequent publication in 2008, the World 
Bank reassessed the economic case for investment in rural electrification on the basis of 
high willingness to pay exceeding the long-run marginal cost of supply (World Bank and IEG 
2008). Although it emphasised the relatively weak evidence base behind many of the 
claimed development benefits of rural electrification, it also concluded that investments in this 
area can generate economic benefits (ibid.). The increased interest in energy supply and its 
links to poverty reduction culminated with the Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) initiative, 
with 2012 being declared the United Nations (UN) year for Sustainable Energy for All. 
As illustrated by Figure 3.3, private finance for electrification grew much faster than total FDI 
during the first half of the 1990s until 1997. This growth was largely driven by the wave of 
privatisations during that decade, as previously described. During this period, the overall 
percentage of private investment in total infrastructure investment in developing countries 
rose to 53 per cent (Hausman et al. 2014) from a situation of almost total state ownership of 
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electricity infrastructure in developing countries. The boom, however, was relatively short-
lived and ended with the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which brought about a sudden reduction 
in private lending for infrastructure projects. It is worth noting that this was not the case for 
overall FDI, which was relatively less affected by the crisis. The fact that the Asian financial 
crisis had this effect reveals the extent to which private investment had been dependent on 
international market conditions in the 1990s.3 Private investments fell and stayed at low 
levels until approximately 2004. From 2004 onwards, however, private investment in 
electricity has risen substantially, while overall private investments in infrastructure have also 
risen from 2002 onwards, leading a World Bank report to describe them as ‘a game changer 
in infrastructure financing’ (World Bank 2011: 5). 
Figure 3.3 Private finance for electrification and total FDI inflows to 
developing countries, 1990–2012 (US$bn) 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from World Bank (2014). and WDI (2014). All figures are in billions and in constant 2009 
US$. 
By contrast with the 1997 Asian crisis, private investments in electrification have apparently 
not been affected by the 2008 financial crisis, and indeed have risen rapidly since then. 
There are a number of explanations for this. First, at the time of the crash, there was a 
perception in some circles that the emerging economies had decoupled from the developed 
world, meaning that the crash would not affect them. Although this assessment was highly 
debatable, the perception of it may have had the effect of encouraging investors to keep 
investing in the year following the crash. Moreover, the main emerging countries attracting 
private investment (i.e. China, India and Brazil) used their state development banks to drive 
investment, and enacted large stimuli in 2009. China’s stimulus, for example, accounted for 
14 per cent of its GDP, and it focused mostly on infrastructure, including the electricity 
sector.4 
These trends reflect the increased use of blended finance type models in the multilateral 
agencies, where ODA is used to leverage private investment.5 When it is structured correctly, 
                                               
3 Interview with Stephen Spratt, Research Fellow at IDS, 18 and 25 November 2014. 
4 ibid. 
5 ibid. 
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blended finance can assure private investors of a long-term return on capital, thereby 
‘potentially unlocking the trillions of assets controlled by institutional investors and sovereign 
wealth funds’ (Griffith-Jones, Ocampo and Spratt 2012: 39). In addition, institutions such as 
the World Bank also guarantee private sector investments in generation, and as these 
guarantees are not costly, they do not show up as a large investment in ODA.6 
3.2 From whom? 
Figure 3.4, presenting the top five donors for electrification, illustrates the changing role of 
the World Bank, with a clear decreasing trend through the 1990s and until 2004, after which 
there is a large increase. As we have seen, much of the increased investments made by the 
World Bank in electrification after 2000 were channelled towards blended finance models 
rather than the traditional mechanism of directly investing in public utilities. Moreover, 
developing country governments have increasingly come to opt for these mechanisms as 
well. This may have allowed the World Bank to achieve greater impacts with its investments.7 
Japan’s contributions saw an increase for most of the 1990s, but then it curtailed its support 
considerably after 1999, due to economic problems, reaching a low in 2007 (Yamaguchi 
2005). The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) show fluctuations along a slightly decreasing trend through the whole period. 
Figure 3.4 Top five donors: contributions to electrification 1990–2011 
(US$bn) 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from AidData 2.1 (2014) and World Bank (2014). All figures are in millions and in constant 
2009 US$. 
3.3 To whom? 
Figure 3.5 reveals the trends in private finance for electrification according to the 
geographical area receiving it. Growth in private investment during the 1990s was largely 
driven by privatisation in Latin America. In particular, much of this investment was 
                                               
6 Interview with Dana Rysankova, World Bank Senior Energy Specialist, 4 December 2014. 
7 ibid. 
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concentrated in Brazil, which opened up its energy sector through privatisations in the 1990s, 
as well as bringing hyperinflation under control. Private investment in Brazil in the mid-1990s 
initially targeted the distribution sector and consisted mainly of the purchase of existing public 
assets or concessions by which private entities took over the management of state-owned 
enterprises. However, there was not much greenfield investment in the expansion of 
generation and transmission infrastructure, which, in addition to a drought in a country with 
over 80 per cent of hydroelectric capacity, brought Brazil to a severe energy crisis in 2001–
02. The privatisation process was then brought to a stall. A system of energy auctions was 
implemented instead to attract competitive long-term private investment to the generation 
sector on the basis of a careful planning process based on demand forecasts. Transparent 
and secure long-term power purchase agreements succeeded in attracting large amounts of 
private investment, mostly for renewable generation. The expansion was linked to a fair 
return on investments and to universal service access, together with tariff adjustments.8 
Figure 3.5 Regional split of private finance for electrification 1990–2012 
(US$bn) 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from World Bank (2014). All figures are in billions and in constant 2009 US$. 
As is clear from Figure 3.5, strong growth between 2005 and 2010 was also mainly driven by 
investments in South Asia, mainly in India, responding to the 2003 Electricity Act which 
opened the Indian power sector up to private investors, which were encouraged to establish 
franchises (Pargal and Banerjee 2014). India’s new Electricity Act aimed at increasing 
competition mainly in the generation sector, while the transmission and distribution sectors 
have remained mostly public.9 The private sector was responsible for 2.5 gigawatt (GW)      
(3 per cent of generating capacity) in 1991, rising to 62.5 GW (29 per cent) in 2012. Finances 
for distribution, however, have been deteriorating, which the World Bank blames on the lack 
of creditworthiness of state power distribution utilities, as well as criticising ongoing state 
subsidies for state utility companies (ibid.). Others point at the large share of transmission 
and distribution losses as a consequence of illegal connections and the politicisation of rural 
electrification.10 
                                               
8 Interview with Professor Roberto Schaeffer, Energy Planning Program, Alberto Luiz Coimbra Institute for Graduate Studies 
and Research in Engineering (COPPE), Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 9 December 2014. 
9 Interview with Hari Natarajan, Senior Technical Advisor for the Indo-German Energy Programme, Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, 20 December 2014. 
10 ibid. 
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Figure 3.6 shows that during the privatisation wave of the 1990s, most private investment 
was not directed at greenfield projects but to the acquisition of state-owned assets or 
concessions for the management of public assets. 
Figure 3.6 Private finance for electrification per type of finance (US$bn) 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from World Bank (2014). All figures are in billions and in constant 2009 US$. 
Figure 3.7 shows that Latin America and the Caribbean captured most of the proceeds for 
the acquisition of existing state-owned infrastructures. As a result, there was not an 
equivalent growth in capital formation, which led to the paradoxical situation of Brazil 
experiencing record inflows of private investment in electricity infrastructure followed by a 
severe crisis in electricity supply in 2001–02.11 
Figure 3.7 Private finance for electrification per type of finance, 1990–
2012 (US$bn) 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from World Bank (2014). All figures are in billions and in constant 2009 US$. 
                                               
11 Interview with Professor Roberto Schaeffer, Energy Planning Program, Alberto Luiz Coimbra Institute for Graduate Studies 
and Research in Engineering (COPPE), Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 9 December 2014. 
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At the country level, Figure 3.8 shows that 11 countries captured approximately 50 per cent 
of aid for electrification during the past two decades.12 India was the main recipient of aid for 
generation with non-renewable sources, mainly coal and gas power plants, and received    
13 per cent of all aid for non-renewable generation during the 1990–2010 period, followed by 
Egypt and China, which received 10 per cent and 7 per cent respectively. China was the 
main recipient of aid for renewable generation during that period, receiving 12 per cent of 
global aid in this area, followed by India, with 11 per cent, and Pakistan, with 6 per cent. 
Meanwhile, hydroelectricity was the dominant form of renewable generation. 
Figure 3.8 Electrification aid by recipient 1990–2010 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from World Bank (2014) 
As illustrated by Figure 3.9, private finance for electrification is more strongly concentrated, 
with Brazil, India and China capturing half of it.13 Brazil captured more than 50 per cent of 
global private finance for transmission and distribution, as a result of the privatisation of 
distribution companies during the 1990s. It was also the highest recipient of private finance 
for generation with renewable sources, mainly in the hydro sector, and received 39 per cent 
of global private finance for this concept during the 1990–2010 period, followed by India and 
China, which received 8 per cent and 7 per cent respectively. Meanwhile, India captured     
32 per cent of global private investment in generation with non-renewable sources, mostly 
coal power plants, followed by China (9 per cent) and the Russian Federation (8 per cent). 
Figures 3.10 and 3.11 show the countries that received the most and the least ODA and 
private investment for electrification in per capita terms. Figure 3.10 shows firstly a bias 
towards smaller countries, meaning that countries with smaller populations are likely to get 
higher levels of aid per capita. It also shows that the higher levels of aid per capita in the past 
two decades have not actually been channelled towards those countries with the highest gap 
in electricity access, particularly sub-Saharan African countries like Nigeria and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), or countries with high levels of poverty (proxied with 
infant mortality rates), like Angola, Haiti, the DRC and Zimbabwe. Political drivers seem to be 
behind high levels of aid to the Iraqi electricity infrastructure, which received funding mainly 
                                               
12 Our data do not include for government finance and hence downplay the importance of China, which accounted for around 60 
per cent of the growth of investment in power plants in non-OECD countries between 2000 and 2012 (IEA 2014). 
13 The fact that PPI might miss out on the undisclosed private investments that could be significant in China means that 
concentration of private investment could be even higher. 
16 
for the transmission and distribution networks that were destroyed after the war, or the low 
levels of aid provided to countries ruled by repressive regimes, such as Myanmar and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Other countries, like Iran and Cuba, already enjoy 
near universal access and would not require high levels of aid. 
Figure 3.9 Private electrification finance by recipient 1990–2012 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from World Bank (2014) 
As regards the countries that received the greatest and smallest levels of private investment 
per capita, it can be seen in Figure 3.11 that South American countries that embraced the 
privatisation wave starting in the 1980s are at the top of the list, mainly Brazil, Chile and 
Argentina. As with aid, two Caribbean countries, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, have 
captured significant inflows per capita. Meanwhile, the private sector has left behind sub-
Saharan African countries with low access rates such as Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Tanzania and Kenya. 
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Figure 3.10 Top and bottom 15 country recipients of electrification aid per 
capita 1990–2010 (US$) 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from WDI (2014) and AidData 2.1 (2014) 
Figure 3.11 Top and bottom 15 country recipients of private electrification 
finance per capita 1990–2010 (US$) 
 
Source: Authors’ own based on data from WDI (2014) and World Bank (2014) 
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3.4 What for? 
This subsection shows the allocation of funds across the hardware elements of generation, 
transmission and distribution infrastructure and the software elements related to policy, 
management and capacity building. 
Figure 3.12 reveals the decreasing importance of generation in ODA budgets, from 1995 
onwards, with an increasing share of transmission and distribution and policy and 
management projects. Conversely, in Figure 3.13, the private sector shows an increasing 
emphasis on generation projects as opposed to transmission and distribution, with the 
exception of the privatisation wave of the 1990s which involved the sale of public distribution 
companies. Generation is generally more amenable to the private sector than transmission 
and distribution because it provides a tradable commodity, whereas the transmission and 
distribution of power are natural monopolies providing network services (Besant-Jones 
2006). 
Figure 3.12 Electrification ODA by subtype (US$m), 1990–2010 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from AidData 2.1 (2014). All figures are in millions and in constant 2009 US$. 
 
19 
Figure 3.13 PPI electrification finance by Subtype (US$m), 1990–2012 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from World Bank (2014). All figures are in millions and in constant 2009 US$. 
 
Figure 3.14 suggests that electrification aid has not significantly increased its focus on 
renewable energy sources, as the shares between renewable and non-renewable sources 
are quite similar. The low share of renewable energy shown by the data, even in the most 
recent years, could be because some forms of public assistance for renewables are not 
classified as ODA if they are used as a part of a larger package of concessional finance. 
ODA may also be making an important contribution to renewable energy which is not well 
captured by the data – for example, if it guarantees investments in generation, as we have 
seen. Among renewables, hydropower technology has been the most funded by donors in 
the past two decades, whereas finance for non-renewable generation is concentrated in coal 
and gas. However, aid to coal power plants has been nearly abandoned in the past decade. 
Figure 3.14 Electrification aid by type of generation (US$m), 1990–2010 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from AidData 2.1 (2014). All figures are in millions and in constant 2009 US$. Only 
projects classified in subtype as ‘generation’ are included. 
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Figure 3.15, meanwhile, presents the share between renewable and non-renewable per 
donor. Some institutions, such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC), have explicitly 
moved towards renewables as a focus of financing14 but the aggregated data for the past two 
decades still do not show a clear shift. The large amount of World Bank projects for which 
data about energy source are not available is also preventing us from drawing clear 
conclusions. 
Figure 3.15 Electrification aid for generation per donor and energy source 
1990–2010 (US$bn) 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from AidData 2.1 (2014). All figures are in billions and in constant 2009 US$. Only projects 
classified in subtype as ‘generation’ are included. 
 
Figure 3.16 shows that private finance has tended to favour non-renewable generation 
technologies, particularly coal in the second half of the 2000s. However, the most recent 
period (2011–12) shows a growth in private sector finance for renewable generation which is 
also supported by alternative sources of data such as those provided by Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance (Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre/Bloomberg New Energy Finance 2014). 
Globally, private investment in renewable energy has grown at an annual average of 21 per 
cent since 2007, nearly doubling between 2011 and 2012 (World Bank 2013). This was partly 
                                               
14 Interview with Stephen Spratt, Research Fellow at IDS, 18 and 25 November 2014. 
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caused by the cutting back of policies in support of renewable energy in Europe following the 
crash, which led companies to search for new investment opportunities in developing 
countries.15 
Figure 3.16 PPI electrification finance by type of generation (US$m), 1990–
2012 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from World Bank (2014). All figures are in millions and in constant 2009 US$. Figure 3.12 
only includes projects classified in subtype as ‘generation’. 
The relatively even spread of both aid and private investment across power generation 
technologies in developing countries reflects their use of most available options to satisfy 
surging electricity demand (IEA 2014). 
3.5 Impact on electrification rates 
Our analysis does not show a clear relationship between the levels of ODA and private 
investment received and its progress towards increasing electrification rates. There is a high 
correlation between total aid and private investment received and the reduction in total 
unelectrified population. However, it disappears when we correct for the scale effect and look 
at correlations between electrification rates and finance flows per capita. This could be due to 
the different shares of both aid and private investments in electricity that different countries 
direct towards energy access, understood as an increase in the number of connections and 
the use of a sufficient amount of electricity. For example, the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) estimates that between 5 per cent and 20 per cent of the total investment recorded in 
the PPI database goes towards energy access (IEA 2011). It is likely that a large share goes 
towards improving infrastructure for those already connected or to support economic growth 
through commercial uses. 
Figures 3.17 and 3.18 map countries according to the percentage of total ODA or private 
investments for electrification they have received in the past two decades and the 
percentage of global population without access to electricity that live in these countries. India 
                                               
15 Interview with Dana Rysankova, World Bank Senior Energy Specialist, 4 December 2014. 
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has received the largest share of aid and the second largest share of private investment for 
electrification, but still hosts the largest number of people without access to electricity in the 
world. As we will see, however, India has nevertheless made a significant effort to reduce the 
number of unelectrified people since 1990. China is the second country in terms of aid 
received for electrification since 1990, but now claims a 100 per cent electrification rate. 
However, most progress towards this goal was made before 1990. Brazil has received the 
largest share of private investment for electrification and a significant share of aid and has 
also nearly eradicated lack of access to electricity. Other countries showing relatively large 
shares of aid for electrification and small access gaps include Egypt, Vietnam, South Africa, 
the Philippines, Morocco and Argentina. On the other side, countries that show large access 
gaps but had received relatively low levels of aid for electrification until 2010 include Nigeria, 
Ethiopia, Tanzania, DRC and Bangladesh. Figure 3.18 reveals that private investment has 
not reached countries with very low levels of access such as Bangladesh, Nigeria and 
Ethiopia, but has flown widely to countries like Brazil, China and Argentina, which had 
already provided near-universal access by the year 2000. 
Figure 3.17 Percentage of world electrification aid received per country 
1990–2010 and percentage of world unelectrified population in 2010 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from WDI (2014), AidData 2.1 (2014) and IEA (2012). 
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Figure 3.18 Percentage of private investments received per country 1990–
2010 and percentage of world unelectrified population in 2010 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from WDI (2014), World Bank (2014) and IEA (2012). 
Table 3.1 lists the countries that have shown the largest increase in electrification rates since 
2000. For example, Nepal had an electrification rate of 15.6 per cent in 2000 and had 
reached 76 per cent in 2011. Myanmar’s electrification rate was 5 per cent in 2000 and is 
now 49 per cent. Bangladesh’s rate was 20.4 per cent in 2000 and is now 60 per cent. 
Cameroon and India follow suit. In absolute numbers, South and East Asian countries have 
made the largest effort to provide electricity to an increasing number of their populations 
since 2000 and are to be praised for most of the global progress during the past two 
decades. India stands out with an additional 273 million people electrified since 2000, 
followed by Bangladesh, with 44 million, and Indonesia, with 32 million. However, these 
figures need to be looked at with caution. For example, the definition of rural ‘access’ in India 
has changed through the years, often involving just the availability of distribution lines 
passing by a village, even if few households are connected or if electricity is available for as 
little as one hour per day.16 The large inflow of private investment received in India since the 
early 2000s is not thought to have had a significant impact on access, as it was mainly 
directed to increasing generation capacity to improve the supply in large and some second 
tier cities.17 
 
                                               
16 Interview with Hari Natarajan, Senior Technical Advisor for the Indo-German Energy Programme, Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH. 20 December 2014. 
17 ibid. 
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Table 3.1 Top 20 countries increasing electrification rates 2000–2011 
Country Electrification rate % 
2000 
Electrification rate % 
2011 
Incremental number 
of people with 
electricity 2000–2011 
(million) 
Nepal 15.4 76 12 
Myanmar 5 49 21 
Bangladesh 20.4 60 44 
Cameroon 20 54 3 
India 43 75 273 
Nicaragua 48 78 1 
Dominican Republic 66.8 96 2 
Gabon 31 60 0.2 
Honduras 54.5 83 2 
Morocco 71.1 99 8 
Ghana 45 72 4 
Bolivia 60.4 87 2 
Senegal 30.1 57 1 
Namibia 34 60 0.3 
Angola 12 38 1 
Botswana 22 46 0.1 
Paraguay 74.7 98 1 
Sri Lanka 62 85 4 
El Salvador 70.8 92 1 
Vietnam 75.8 96 16 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from WDI (2014), IEA (2002) and IEA (2013). 
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The scale of the progress in increasing electrification rates, in terms of number of people with 
a connection, does not always reflect the depth or quality of this access, which is generally 
measured in terms of actual consumption. As shown in Table 3.2, many of the countries 
previously described as high achievers actually show very low consumption levels per capita, 
particularly Nepal and Myanmar, but also India. There could be several causes for this in 
addition to low household consumption, such as low industrial and commercial uses,18 or the 
prevalence of self-generation, which may not appear in official energy statistics. 
Table 3.2 Countries with high percentages of access to electricity but low 
electricity consumption per capita, 2010 
Year Yearly electricity 
consumption per capita 
kWh 
Percentage of population 
with access to electricity 
Nepal 103.4 76.3 
Myanmar 121.1 48.8 
Nigeria 135.4 50.3 
Senegal 187.7 53.5 
Cote d’Ivoire 224.7 58.9 
Ghana 299.1 60.5 
Sri Lanka 449.2 76.6 
Pakistan 457.8 67.4 
Nicaragua 470.4 72.1 
Guatemala 569.2 80.0 
Bolivia 592.5 80.2 
Indonesia 634.5 73.0 
India 641.3 75.0 
Philippines 641.5 83.3 
Honduras 668.9 79.9 
Morocco 783.3 98.9 
Dominican Republic 830.5 96.9 
El Salvador 852.5 91.6 
Gabon 974.2 60.0 
Algeria 986.9 99.3 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from WDI (2014) and IEA (2012) 
Figure 3.19 illustrates that there is a wide range of consumption levels per capita among 
countries with near-universal access to electricity. Electricity can only convey its potential to 
reduce poverty and promote economic growth when it is used at a sufficient level. Therefore, 
high access rates with low electricity consumption levels still reflect pervasive energy 
poverty. 
                                               
18 ibid. 
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Figure 3.19 kWh per capita and population with access to electricity at 
country level, 2010 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from WDI (2014) and IEA (2012). 
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4 Econometric model 
This section provides an econometric analysis of the determinants of electrification finance 
flows in developing countries. The objective is to understand why some developing countries 
receive more finance for electrification than others in per capita terms, as has been observed 
in Section 3, and to derive policy recommendations on how to improve the attractiveness of 
countries receiving insufficient flows. 
The period of examination covers the years ranging from 1991 to 2010. A potentially 
problematic characteristic of electrification aid and private electrification investments is that 
these flows are often lumpy. This arises because there are certain years when large 
investments occur (e.g. when a major hydroelectric project is constructed) that are 
subsequently followed by years in which very little or no finance is received at all, even 
though the project is still in progress (Hausman et al. 2014: 59). To minimise this issue, both 
the dependent and independent variables used in the econometric analysis were smoothed 
and thus constructed as the means of either ten- or five-year periods. Specifically, ten-year 
panels for 1991–2000 and 2001–10 were created, and were subsequently estimated as 
pooled cross-sections for the whole 20-year period. In addition, five-year panels for 1991–95, 
1996–2000, 2001–05 and 2006–10 were also constructed, and were once again estimated 
as a pooled cross-section for the entire period. The use of both ten- and five-year panels 
allows us to examine the sensitivity of the results to the level of year aggregation. 
Aggregating the data into ten-year panels compared to five-year panels has the advantage of 
minimising the issue of missing values, which is a common problem when working with data 
from developing countries. Nonetheless, the use of more aggregated data has its drawbacks 
since it captures to a lesser degree yearly variations in the explanatory variables. Five-year 
panels increase our sample size and capture more of the variation of the covariates through 
the two decades. 
To determine the patterns of electrification finance flows in developing countries, regressions 
are estimated through ordinary least squares (OLS) and, due to the truncation of the 
dependent variable, as a left-censored Tobit. The advantage of a left-censored Tobit 
technique is that it includes all countries that received aid or private investment in any time 
period, even if they show zero values in other time periods, as long as data for the control 
variables are available. Because finance for electricity is very lumpy, this technique is 
particularly appropriate for our data set. 
The estimated models are specified as follows: 
 𝑙𝑛(𝑦𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜇𝑐 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 denotes either electrification aid received per capita or private electrification 
finance received per capita for country 𝒊 in period 𝒕; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 denotes a matrix of country-level 
characteristics that may affect electrification finance; 𝜇𝑐 represents continent-level dummies 
that capture time-invariant characteristics which may affect electrification finance flows; 𝛿𝑡 
represents time dummy variables that help control for trends in electrification finance flows; 
and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 
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The covariates included in the matrix 𝑋𝑖𝑡 can be grouped into five general categories: 
1. Size, structure and prospects of the economy, including GDP per capita, GDP per 
capita squared, annual GDP growth rate, and population size19 
2. Poverty, including the infant mortality rate 
3. Energy poverty, including lagged values of electric power consumption per capita20 
4. Governance, including the Freedom House political rating and dummy variables for 
the country’s power supply structure 
5. Energy resources, including the gross theoretical capability of hydropower and the 
pump price of diesel fuel.21 
The linear and quadratic terms of the GDP per capita variable allow us to see not only if 
finance flows are directed towards high- or low-income economies, but also if this 
relationship is non-linear. The Freedom House rating for political rights variable (Freedom 
House 2014) provides a yearly assessment of the state of global freedom as experienced by 
individuals. The rating ranges from one to seven, taking the value of one for countries with 
the best assessment of global political rights and civil liberties and the value of seven for the 
worst. We would therefore expect the rating to be inversely related to aid and private 
investment in electricity. The power supply structure variables capture the sensitivity of 
electrification finance flows to the country’s stage of power sector reform as defined in 
Besant-Jones (2006). The reference category is constituted by countries that have retained 
the traditional structure of a vertically integrated monopoly. The middle category (VIP22 + 
IPPs,23 Comb. gen. and trans. entity) includes countries with a national generation, 
transmission or distribution entity, a combined national generation and transmission entity, or 
a combined transmission and distribution entity acting as the single buyer with IPPs that sell 
power to it and regional distribution entities unbundled from the monopolist that buy power 
from it. The final, most advanced category (Many dist., gen., and trans. entities) includes 
countries with many distribution and generation entities and a transmission entity formed 
from unbundling the monopolist, in which the transmission entity acts as a single buyer of 
power from the generators and IPPs and sells power to the distribution entities and large 
users of power. We acknowledge that this is a rough measurement of power sector reform, 
which is more a process than a static event and has several dimensions in addition to 
privatisation. However, the complexity of power reform processes as well as time constraints 
as part of this study have precluded a more detailed and updated measurement of the stage 
of power sector reform. 
On the other hand, 𝜇𝑐 includes dummies for the continents of America, Asia and Europe, 
where Africa represents the reference category. Finally, in the models constructed based on 
the ten-year panels, 𝛿𝑡 includes a time dummy for 2001–10, where the 1991–2000 period is 
taken as the reference category. The estimations performed on the five-year panels include 
                                               
19 Previous specifications also included the square of the logarithm of the population but this variable was dropped from the final 
model since it was generally not statistically significant. A variable denoting crude oil reserves was also included in previous 
specifications but was subsequently not incorporated. This was because the variable was somewhat correlated with the variable 
pump price of diesel fuel and because it was generally not significant. Finally, other covariates such as the country’s installed 
electricity capacity or the pump price of gasoline were not included since they are highly correlated with other variables such as 
electric power consumption or the pump price of diesel, respectively. 
20 Although potentially important to the analysis, a variable indicating the country’s electrification rate or access to electricity was 
not included in the final specification for a variety of reasons. First, among the 134 countries examined, information on 
electrification rates was only available for 75 of them. In addition, over the 20-year period of analysis, data on country-level 
electrification rates could only be obtained from 2009 onwards. Finally, for the years in which the information was indeed 
available, changes in the data collection method imply that these annual figures are not directly comparable to one another. 
21 In results not shown, the investment share of GDP was also included as a regressor. The variable was subsequently not 
included since it was generally not significant. As argued by Hausman et al. (2014: 59), this covariate is thought to capture the 
prospective rewards of a growing capital stock for either electrification aid or privately financed electrification projects. 
Furthermore, it can be interpreted as testing whether these financial flows followed previous investments. 
22 Vertically integrated monopolist. 
23 Independent power producers. 
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time dummies for 1996–2000, 2001–05, and 2006–10, where the 1991–95 period is taken as 
the reference category.24 
Since the dependent variable is in logarithms, the OLS estimations only include country-level 
observations that received a positive amount of electrification finance flows in the period of 
reference. Limiting the analysis to countries that receive a positive amount of electrification 
finance is likely to affect the econometric results. Therefore, the Tobit estimations include all 
countries irrespective of whether or not they received zero electrification finance.25 
 
  
                                               
24 Data on GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, population size, infant mortality rate, electric power consumption and pump price 
of diesel fuel were taken from WDI (2014). Information on the country’s hydropower gross theoretical capability was obtained 
from WEC (2001, 2004, 2010). Information on the country’s political rating was taken from the Freedom in the World Country 
Ratings database collected by Freedom House. See www.freedomhouse.org. Information on the country’s power supply 
structure was obtained from Besant-Jones (2006). 
25 Given that the dependent variable is in logarithms, the Tobit model was estimated with the dependent variable defined as 
𝑙𝑛(𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 1). 
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5 Results 
As previously stated, estimations of Eq. (1) which help explain the allocation of electrification 
finance based on recipients’ characteristics were performed for the data aggregated into both 
ten- and five-year panels. When applicable, the regressions were corrected for 
heteroskedasticity using robust standard errors based on the method outlined in White 
(1980). 
Table 5.1 shows results of OLS estimations including both dependent variables on aid and 
private investment (PPI) and both ten- and five-year panels covering the period from 1991 to 
2010. Electrification aid flows grouped in ten-year panels are positively associated with a 
country’s annual GDP growth rate and negatively related with its population size and 
Freedom House rating, where these last two coefficients are statistically significant at the      
1 per cent level. The positive relationship with GDP growth indicates that electricity aid is 
specifically allocated to places that are growing more quickly. The negative relationship with 
population size indicates that smaller countries receive more aid per capita. The Freedom 
House rating variable sheds light on whether the quality of the recipient’s country governance 
is important for donors. Consequently, the negative sign suggests that donors indeed favour 
countries with higher quality governance. The infant mortality rate, which is a measure of 
poverty, is negatively related with total electrification aid, where this variable is statistically 
significant at the 10 per cent level. This could indicate a shift in donor priorities towards 
covering basic needs such as health and nutrition in the poorest countries, instead of access 
to electricity, whose link to poverty reduction was questioned by the World Bank in the 
1990s. Compared to 1991–2010, aid flows appear to be lower during 2001–10 since the time 
dummy for this period is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. Energy poverty, 
measured as electricity consumption per capita, is not significant enough to explain aid flows. 
Regressions using five-year panels provide very similar results but show a higher size of the 
coefficients of GDP growth and infant mortality rate. A lower year disaggregation can also 
capture the impact of power sector reform, showing that countries at the early stages of 
power sector reform appear positively and significantly correlated with total flows of 
electrification aid. Compared to 1991–95, the two five-year periods after 2000 appear to 
receive lower aid flows. 
We now shift our attention to private electrification finance flows, where OLS results are also 
presented in Table 5.2. It can be seen that total flows are highly responsive to GDP per 
capita, where this covariate has a positive but decreasing effect on the dependent variable. 
Moreover, the country’s hydro resources, its power supply structure compared to countries 
with a vertically integrated monopoly, and being located in Asia also influence total private 
electrification flows in a positive manner. On the contrary, population size and the lagged 
values of electric power consumption per capita produce a negative effect on total private 
flows. Results with five-year panels are broadly similar but are able to capture the impact of 
the variability of fossil fuel prices, with countries with higher prices attracting more private 
investment for electrification. Electric power consumption per capita is not significant when 
using five-year periods. The period 1996–2000 saw the highest level of private investment as 
compared with the reference period 1991–95, with lower investment after 2000. 
The Tobit estimations on the determinants of electrification aid and private investment flows 
are presented in Table 5.2. In the case of total electrification aid, the sign and significance of 
the coefficients are similar to those obtained in the OLS model, showing that countries with 
growing economies, low infant mortality rates, a good governance rating and which are at the 
early stages of power sector reform are likely to receive more aid for electrification. Besides, 
smaller countries receive more electrification aid per capita. 
Tobit estimations on the determinants of private electrification finance flows show, like OLS 
estimations, that these are positively associated with GDP per capita but with a decreasing 
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rate, and with high fossil fuel prices. Unlike the OLS results, Tobit estimations show a 
stronger influence of power sector reform, with countries at the most advanced stages of 
reform likely to receive more investment, but countries at early stages also receiving 
significantly more investment than those keeping a monopolistic power sector. Besides, a 
better governance rating has a positive influence that is not captured by OLS estimations. 
European countries are negatively associated with private investment in electrification. 
Some interesting differences between drivers of aid and private finance for electrification are 
that recipient countries’ income levels do not seem to influence aid, but they have a strong 
influence on private finance. Poverty rates which are proxied with infant mortality rates do not 
have an influence on private finance, but limit aid for electrification, probably as donors’ 
priorities shift towards covering basic needs. Countries with growing economies are favoured 
by aid flows, but not by private investors. Private investment is much more responsive than 
aid to market forces such as power sector reform, the high price of fossil fuels (which could 
also proxy for cost recovery pricing in the power sector) and the cost and availability of hydro 
resources (measured as gross theoretical capability of hydropower). Private finance also 
shows a positive geographic bias towards Asian countries and a negative bias towards 
European countries and this is not observed in aid flows. The energy poverty of the recipient 
country does not show a significant influence on either aid or private investment. Our model 
can explain much more of the variation of private investment than that of aid, as shown by 
the R-square. This is probably because the model does not include covariates related to the 
political and historical links between donors and recipients, which play a strong influence on 
allocation of aid. Previous research has shown, for example, that countries’ colonial histories 
and voting patterns in the UN explain more of the variation in aid allocated than economic 
and governance variables (Alesina and Dollar 2000). 
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Table 5.1 OLS dependent variables: log of electrification aid and log of 
electrification PPI (pooled ten- and five-year averages), 1991–2010 
 Aid: 10 
year 
Aid: 5 year PPI: 10 
year 
PPI: 5 year 
Log (GDP per capita) 0.828 
(1.764) 
–0.428 
(1.318) 
6.933*** 
(2.280) 
6.060*** 
(2.074) 
[Log (GDP per capita)]2 –0.083 
(0.122) 
–0.014 
(0.092) 
–0.410*** 
(0.155) 
–0.349** 
(0.141) 
Annual GDP growth rate 0.099** 
(0.044) 
0.160*** 
(0.046) 
–0.007 
(0.057) 
0.051 
(0.049) 
Log (population) –0.290*** 
(0.110) 
–0.271*** 
(0.096) 
–0.305** 
(0.118) 
–0.251*** 
(0.091) 
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) –0.142* 
(0.078) 
–0.217*** 
(0.064) 
0.039 
(0.073) 
0.039 
(0.069) 
Electric power consumption (kWh) (t-1) 0.148 
(0.177) 
0.198 
(0.172) 
–0.462* 
(0.245) 
–0.252 
(0.154) 
Freedom House rating –0.240*** 
(0.088) 
–0.227*** 
(0.063) 
–0.044 
(0.105) 
–0.042 
(0.081) 
Hydropower: Gross theoretical capability 
(MWh/year) 
–0.007 
(0.011) 
–0.007 
(0.009) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
Pump price per diesel fuel (US$ per litre) 0.801 
(0.860) 
0.870 
(0.623) 
1.304 
(0.805) 
1.353** 
(0.569) 
PSS: VIP + IPPs, Comb. gen. and trans. entity 0.464 
(0.328) 
0.651** 
(0.262) 
1.063** 
(0.487) 
0.968*** 
(0.362) 
PSS: Many dist., gen., and trans. entities 0.236 
(0.390) 
0.369 
(0.368) 
0.956 
(0.643) 
0.820* 
(0.448) 
America 0.373 
(0.506) 
0.235 
(0.397) 
0.726 
(0.509) 
0.533 
(0.454) 
Asia 0.463 
(0.435) 
0.162 
(0.334) 
1.743*** 
(0.352) 
1.265*** 
(0.344) 
Europe –0.282 
(0.612) 
–0.123 
(0.539) 
1.272 
(0.835) 
0.884 
(0.629) 
t = 2001–10 –0.846* 
(0.455) 
 –0.669 
(0.437) 
 
t = 1996–2000  –0.234 
(0.267) 
 0.895** 
(0.383) 
t = 2001–05  –1.156*** 
(0.351) 
 –0.438 
(0.390) 
t = 2006–10  –1.438*** 
(0.536) 
 –0.373 
(0.487) 
R2 0.318 0.325 0.507 0.441 
Observations 150 271 107 173 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Dependent variable is in per capita terms. PPI refers to private participation in infrastructure. Monetary figures are in constant 
2009 US$. PSS refers to power supply structure. VIP refers to vertically integrated monopolist. IPP refers to independent power 
producer. A constant was included in all regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2 Tobit, dependent variables: log of electrification aid and log of 
electrification PPI (pooled ten- and five-year averages), 1991–2010 
 Aid: 10 
year 
Aid: 5 year PPI: 10 
year 
PPI: 5 year 
Log (GDP per capita) 0.348 
(0.902) 
0.376 
(0.713) 
3.139* 
(1.868) 
4.265** 
(1.741) 
[Log (GDP per capita)]2 –0.030 
(0.062) 
–0.038 
(0.049) 
–0.190 
(0.127) 
–0.268** 
(0.118) 
Annual GDP growth rate 0.046*** 
(0.016) 
0.069*** 
(0.015) 
0.048 
(0.032) 
0.047 
(0.033) 
Log (population) –0.198*** 
(0.050) 
–0.173*** 
(0.041) 
0.012 
(0.095) 
0.046 
(0.085) 
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) –0.074** 
(0.035) 
–0.082*** 
(0.029) 
–0.036 
(0.068) 
0.016 
(0.062) 
Electric power consumption (kWh) (t-1) 0.056 
(0.069) 
0.105 
(0.064) 
–0.108 
(0.132) 
0.040 
(0.135) 
Freedom House rating –0.105** 
(0.041) 
–0.111*** 
(0.033) 
–0.163** 
(0.080) 
–0.169** 
(0.070) 
Hydropower: Gross theoretical capability 
(MWh/year) 
–0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
Pump price of diesel fuel (US$ per litre) 0.264 
(0.309) 
0.164 
(0.238) 
1.267** 
(0.588) 
1.102** 
(0.512) 
PSS: VIP + IPPs, Comb. gen. and trans. entity 0.205 
(0.156) 
0.363*** 
(0.129) 
1.263*** 
(0.306) 
1.697*** 
(0.291) 
PSS: Many dist., gen., and trans. entities –0.000 
(0.212) 
0.078 
(0.174) 
1.607*** 
(0.405) 
1.922*** 
(0.377) 
America 0.062 
(0.239) 
–0.011 
(0.188) 
0.079 
(0.452) 
0.446 
(0.399) 
Asia 0.262 
(0.169) 
0.052 
(0.142) 
0.264 
(0.324) 
0.563* 
(0.302) 
Europe –0.107 
(0.281) 
–0.142 
(0.233) 
–1.607*** 
(0.553) 
–1.376*** 
(0.510) 
t = 2001–10 –0.423** 
(0.165) 
 –0.328 
(0.311) 
 
t = 1996–2000  0.022 
(0.138) 
 1.229*** 
(0.312) 
t = 2001-05  –0.362** 
(0.147) 
 0.641* 
(0.328) 
t = 2006–10  –0.428** 
(0.194) 
 0.707* 
(0.422) 
Pseudo-R2 0.160 0.134 0.184 0.162 
Observations 150 278 150 278 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Dependent variable is in per capita terms. PPI refers to private participation in infrastructure. Monetary figures are in constant 
2009 US$. PSS refers to power supply structure. VIP refers to vertically integrated monopolist. IPP refers to independent power 
producer. A constant was included in all regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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6 Conclusions 
The aim of this paper is to inform policy looking to step up investment in the electricity sector 
of developing countries and align it to other development goals such as universal access to 
energy or sustainability. The three main questions guiding our analysis were: 
1. How and why has the contribution to the electricity sector of private investors and 
donors changed across time? 
2. What are the different motivations of private investors and donors as regards who 
gets finance and what is financed (hardware or software elements of the electricity 
system, renewable or non-renewable generation)? 
3. Are sustainability and equitable access to electricity priorities for private and donor 
investment? 
These questions have been addressed by describing flows of aid and private investment for 
electrification in developing countries during the period 1990–2010 and showing their size, 
recipients, providers, what has been financed (in particular, what is the amount and 
destination of finance for renewable energy), and how funds are related to energy poverty. 
The data analysis has been complemented with interviews with experts to check its reliability 
and interpret the patterns observed. Subsequently, we have specified an econometric model 
to explain inter-country allocation of aid and private investment in the electricity sector 
aggregated per ten- and five-year periods over 1990–2010. 
Firstly, we have observed an increasing participation of the private sector since 1990, driven 
initially by the World Bank’s shift towards attracting private investment instead of directly 
providing capital investments in the electricity sector. The private sector showed a strong 
responsiveness to the World Bank’s approach, rapidly increasing its investment in some 
specific countries. However, the boom was relatively short-lived, ending with the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. As explained in Barnett (2014), the World Bank’s approach had tragic 
consequences for Africa. The emphasis on a model of power sector reform based on 
unbundling the system to promote competition between generators was inappropriate for the 
very small systems of the region, which resisted reform or implemented it badly and 
insufficiently. This led to massive underinvestment, in the so-called ‘lost decades’, which is 
reflected in the large electrification deficits we observe today (Barnett 2014). 
Both ODA and private finance for electrification have seen a revitalisation since 2004. Some 
of the factors contributing to this are a renewed emphasis within donor circles on the 
importance of energy for sustainable development, the increased use of blended finance 
type models in multilateral agencies to leverage private investment, and the large stimulus 
packages with a strong component in electricity infrastructure enacted in China, India and 
Brazil during the 2008 financial crisis. 
Addressing the second question, our data show that donors and the private sector display 
different roles and motivations. There is a clear role for the public sector in the provision of 
universal access, in spite of the decreasing importance of aid relative to private investment 
since the 1990s. 
Private sector investment in the electricity sector is strongly concentrated in a few countries, 
particularly middle-income, emerging economies such as Brazil, India and China, which 
capture half of it. It flows to countries with high income per capita but with a non-linear, 
decreasing relationship, strong governance, with large and low-cost renewable energy 
resources, preferably with unsubsidised energy markets and which have progressed in 
reforming their power sector through unbundling and privatisation. The private sector also 
shows a positive geographic bias towards Asia. As we have seen, sub-Saharan African 
countries with low electrification rates have been mainly left behind. 
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The international public sector, represented by bilateral and multilateral donors, shows a 
higher distribution of funds among countries, with 11 countries capturing 50 per cent of these 
flows. Donors favour countries whose economies are growing quickly, have strong 
governance, and which have started a process of power sector reform. In addition, smaller 
countries tend to receive higher sums of aid per capita. Somewhat surprisingly, electrification 
aid does not favour countries with high levels of poverty, which could indicate a shift in donor 
priorities towards covering basic needs such as health and nutrition in the poorest countries. 
Our analysis shows, backing previous research, that the higher levels of aid per capita in the 
past decades have not actually been channelled to those countries with the highest 
electrification deficits. 
Private sector finance has consistently focused on generation, which as we have suggested 
is more amenable to private participation than other areas of electrification. By contrast, 
ODA’s contribution to generation has gradually fallen over time, while its contribution to 
transmission and distribution, policy, education and research has increased. These trends 
reflect the shift towards the use of ODA as a catalyst for private investment and for areas 
which are unattractive for private investors. 
All this suggests that ODA continues to have a strong role to play financing investment in 
those countries, and those areas (for example, off-grid and mini-grid systems, grid 
connections to the poorest people and transmission and distribution infrastructure) that 
private finance is unlikely to find attractive. 
As regards the third question, neither private investors nor donors show a clear preference 
for renewable generation over fossil fuel-based technologies. Instead, there is a relatively 
even spread of investments across generation technologies, which suggests that the priority 
is to meet a surging electricity demand using whatever source is available. 
The relationship between private investment and aid flows and the provision of universal 
access to electricity is uncertain. Our descriptive data reveal how private investment does not 
necessarily translate into new electricity infrastructure, as it can relate to purely financial 
transactions such as mergers and acquisitions, which were very common during the 
privatisation wave of the 1990s. This was clearly exemplified by Brazil, which experienced 
record figures of private investment during the 1990s followed by a severe crisis in electricity 
supply at the start of the following decade. In any case, the participation of private capital 
was expected to raise the performance of the electricity sector, and that was the rationale of 
power sector reform. Moreover, neither aid nor private investment has been channelled 
towards those countries with the highest access gaps. Often, aid and private investment in 
electrification are used to improve the supply for those already connected or to serve the 
industrial and commercial sector of growing economies. Economic growth can, of course, 
benefit the poor when appropriate redistribution channels are in place, but this would happen 
indirectly. Further analysis would be required to identify those countries that have more 
efficiently used private investment and aid in the electricity sector towards the goal of 
universal access and to understand the policies they put in place to succeed. Further 
understanding of the role of domestic public finance for the provision of universal access is 
also required. We expect to analyse these issues as part of our ongoing research 
programme on pro-poor access to electricity. 
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